

LOPSIDEDNESS IN LEADERS
Strategies for Capturing and Correcting it

Robert E. Kaplan & Robert B. Kaiser
Kaplan DeVries Inc.

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Correspondence: bkaplan@kaplandevries.com or rkaiser@kaplandevries.com

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Frank Farr brought a strong strategic bent to his job as division president.¹ Beyond having an excellent understanding of the marketplace, which he continually refreshed, he had a gift for “seeing over the next hill” and developing a vision of where the organization should go. He also had a gift for communicating his vision vividly and charismatically.

As much as his visionary sense served the company well, the imbalance in Frank Farr’s leadership was predictable. He was relatively weak on the operational side. For one thing, he was externally oriented rather than internally oriented. For another, preferring to fly at relatively high altitudes, he didn’t go in for all that operational detail. Which helped to account for his tendency to be overly ambitious strategically: he just didn’t fully take into account what was actually involved in making the strategic moves. He wasn’t “grounded in the realities of implementation,” as one coworker put it.

It wasn’t that he ignored operations. Anything but. He conducted quarterly operations reviews. He expected his line managers to deliver on their commitments and he was none too happy if they didn’t. But his staff could tell where his true interests lay; they could detect his attitude toward what he privately referred to as the “drudgery” of running the business. His relative inattention to the operational side seemed to account for the fact that neither of the two businesses he was responsible for made plan the previous two years.

That Frank Farr was overbalanced on the strategic-and-operational dichotomy, too concerned with the long term and not oriented enough to the short term was not unusual. Nothing unusual in the fact that he was lopsided: everywhere we look we find managers who lack balance. Too task-oriented and not people-oriented enough (or the reverse). Too tough and not responsive enough to people’s needs (or the reverse). Another variant: the work-life balance of many managers is out of whack.

The idea of the two-sidedness of life and leadership has been around for a long time. Circa 650 B.C., Pythagoras assembled a much-studied Table of Opposites.² The contemporary field of leadership has seen many two-sided models—Blake and Mouton’s “managerial grid,” with its two axes, concern for production and concern for people; Douglas McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y; Robert Quinn’s competing managerial values, results and relationships, stability and change; to name just a few.³

Our modern conceptions of leadership, however, suffer from a serious limitation, reflected in the way they are measured and rooted in the way the idea of two-sidedness is formulated in the first place. They go on the assumption that we need leaders with certain pairs of qualities, but the idea that a manager could go overboard on any of these things seems to be overlooked. Unless your conception makes room for overdoing it, it can’t identify lopsidedness.

Given the prevalence of lopsidedness and given the frequency with which all of us talk about striking balances, what is remarkable is that standard methods for assessing leaders and helping

them perform better don't put a focus on lopsidedness. How could that be? How can we rectify the situation?

What it takes to identify lopsidedness

To pick up lopsidedness, our models of leadership need to be two-sided, since that's what lopsidedness is, placing too much weight on one side and too little on the other. From our firm's research and its extensive experience consulting to senior managers on leadership, we have concluded that there are two basic balances to be struck. First, strategic and operational leadership. Second, forceful and enabling leadership. If there are others as basic to leadership as these two, we haven't found them.

There is nothing revolutionary about defining leadership requirements in terms of dichotomies like this. The two pairs we have singled out are tacitly understood if not fully formulated by most managers. Also, leadership experts have long made these and other similar distinctions in the literature. Forceful and enabling are our terms (actually, the language that managers use) for a distinction made repeatedly over the last 50 years—autocratic and participative, initiating structure and consideration, command-and-control and employee-centered.⁴ Yet the models in common use today—competency models they're called—do not generally define leadership in pairwise fashion. Instead these models consist of lists, often long and not memorable lists, of skills and personal qualities. Our position is that for every truth about leadership there is an equal and opposing truth, and leadership models are more useful for respecting that reality

To identify lopsidedness, or its productive counterpart, versatility, a two-sided model is necessary but not sufficient. We must have a way to determine if a given leader is doing too little, too much or the right amount on each dimension. If it is the ubiquitous 360 feedback survey, it could employ a rating scale that allows us to make this determination. The problem is that most feedback surveys are not designed to let the respondent identify behaviors that are overdone.

In managers, not to mention humans, you can find instances every day of going too far. A manager noted for being quick—quickly assessing a situation, quickly deciding—has a tendency to make hasty decisions. A manager who uses a highly disciplined follow-up system has a tendency to micromanage. As the Center for Creative Leadership's research on derailment showed, the strengths that propel managers up the ladder can become liabilities.⁵ In light of how painfully commonplace overdoing it is, it is a striking oversight that standard assessment tools aren't designed to capture it like they get at underdoing it.⁶

Consider one of the two most common rating scales, what is known as a frequency scale. In other words, to what extent does the manager in question perform various behaviors like plan for the future, delegate, offer praise, and so on. Since this less-to-more scale does not provide a clear line between "very often" and "too often," it, in effect, assumes that more is better. The other rating scale in common use is the evaluation scale, which has raters indicate how competent or effective the manager is on each behavior. The drawback of this scale is it leaves it unclear whether a low score indicates the manager does too little or too much of the desired quality.

What is needed is a rating scale that respects the reality of sub-par performance as either deficiency or excess. Aristotle made this deceptively simple truth central to his Ethics.⁷ He thought of virtue, or efficacy, on something like courage or compassion as the mid-point between excess and deficiency. To measure performance in accordance with this old and worthy idea, we need only employ a rating scale that allows raters to indicate too little, too much, and the right amount. Something along the following lines, for example:

-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
Much too little	Too little	A little too little	The right amount	A little too much	Too much	Much too much

This is like the scale we have built into our 360-degree questionnaire, the Leadership Versatility Index. We know from using this tool with executives for about ten years that, in addition to doing what most questionnaires do, which is to identify deficiency and sufficiency, it also captures the tendency to take things to an extreme.⁸

Note that, with Aristotle and with theorists of leadership whose position it is that the situation determines what behavior will work best, we understand the right amount as being not fixed but relative. While top executives in general need to fly at high altitudes, on selected critical issues the right amount of their involvement is heavy.⁹

Because the Leadership Versatility Index is equipped to identify overdoing, it is able to capture lopsidedness. Of 10 coworkers who rated one executive, 8 indicated that he was too task-oriented and all 10 that he was not people-oriented enough. Of 10 coworkers rating another executive, 7 indicated that she was too focused on her own unit's success and 9 that she was not enough of a team player.

In addition to referring to these individual examples, extreme cases chosen to make the point, let's examine our firm's sample of senior managers in the aggregate. Using an early version of our instrument we constructed two statistically sound five-item scales, one to measure forceful leadership and the other, enabling leadership. If it is true that as a body managers tend to be lopsided on forceful and enabling leadership, then would we not expect the two scales to correlate inversely? In an inverse relationship, the more forceful that managers are, the less enabling; and the more enabling they are, the less forceful. In fact, that is what we found, a correlation of -.56. Using a revised version of the instrument we found a slightly stronger correlation of -.64.¹⁰ Thus, most managers do not move freely between opposing modes; they show a bias in favor of one mode and a bias against its complement. What is striking is that the many studies done on this basic distinction, by whatever name, have turned up not a negative correlation but either a negligible or, most often, a positive correlation.¹¹ Why? We suspect the reason is that research to date has not directly measured overdoing.

The flip side of lopsidedness, versatility

In pursuing the idea of versatility, we are walking a path blazed over three decades ago by "contingency theorists" who worked the idea that different approaches work better in different situations.¹² The Situational Leadership Theory of Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, for example, is predicated on the principle of handling subordinates differently according to their level of ability and motivation. During the same period Victor Vroom put forward his decision making tree that helps managers determine how much to involve others in a decision according to the importance of decision quality, acceptance, speed, and so on.

Many a manager has gone through training on how to use these kinds of "it depends" models yet struggled with applying the prescribed behavior back in the ebb and flow of the workplace. Could the reason be deeper than behavior, a point we will take up later?

In our view it is useful to define versatility, the healthy alternative to lopsidedness, in terms of a pair of opposing virtues. Table 1 contains a partial list of forceful virtues and of enabling virtues, in the middle columns. In the end columns are the virtues taken to an extreme. Table 2 contains a comparable set of lists for strategic and operational leadership.

Table 1. Forceful and Enabling Leadership—Virtues and Vices

FORCEFUL LEADERSHIP		ENABLING LEADERSHIP	
Taken to an extreme	Virtues	Virtues	Taken to an extreme
Dominant to the point of eclipsing subordinates.	Takes charge—in control of his/her unit.	Empowers subordinates to run their own units. Able to let go.	Empowers to a fault. Gives people too much rope.
Other people don't speak out, aren't heard.	Lets people know clearly and with feeling where he/she stands on issues. Declares himself/herself.	Interested in where other people stand on issues. Receptive to their ideas.	People don't know where he/she stands.
Insensitive, callous.	Makes tough calls—including those that have an adverse effect on people.	Compassionate. Responsive to people's needs and feelings.	Overly accommodating. Nice to people at the expense of the work.
Rigid; demoralizing.	Holds people strictly accountable.	Understanding when people are not able to deliver.	Tender-minded. Lets people off the hook.

Because virtues like these are opposites, managers can experience them as in tension with each other, even as contradictory or incompatible. That describes the challenge of achieving versatility: managers must do what humans, even very smart ones, can find it so hard to do, hold two ideas in their heads at the same time. Human beings are susceptible to polarizing. We see it in the we-they dynamic that springs up between departments, or even countries. In lopsided leaders the polarizing takes place inside their heads.

Table 2. Strategic and Operational Leadership—Virtues and Vices

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP		OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP	
Taken to an extreme	Virtues	Virtues	Taken to an extreme
Too much looking down the road.	Focused on setting long-term strategy	Focused on getting short-term results.	Tunnel vision. Myopic.
Hopelessly conceptual. Lost in the clouds.	Thinks broadly—pays attention to the big picture.	Detail-oriented; gets into the specifics of how things actually work.	Bogged down in details.
Too ambitious; at risk of strategic overreach.	Expansive—aggressive about growing the business.	Respects the limits on the organization's capacity to grow.	Conservative; too respectful of limits.

To be versatile on forceful and enabling leadership, then, is to possess good ability on both sides of the duality despite the tendency for managers to have a bias in favor of one and against the other. Likewise for strategic and operational leadership.

Versatility pays off. Our research has found a close association between versatility, as measured by our leadership questionnaire, and overall effectiveness.¹³ In the three samples of senior managers we have studied, we found substantial correlations between ratings of versatility and effectiveness.¹⁴ Versatile managers are consistently regarded as the most effective leaders in their organizations. In the cases where we have readministered the Leadership Versatility Index and the measure of effectiveness in our consulting practice, we have found that a higher rating of effectiveness is associated with greater versatility. And in one case where, under extreme stress, the executive became even more lopsided, his effectiveness rating went down.

Our data has revealed another pattern, in addition to versatile and lopsided. What one might call disengaged, it is the case where managers underdo both sides of a duality, and it is associated with the lowest ratings of effectiveness.

In advocating for versatility, we know we are at risk of being misunderstood as calling for moderation in all things. That is not the case. Versatility means having range of movement, which can include very immoderate behavior when extreme circumstances require it. Parents who yell when their child is in danger or seriously out of line and not responding to reason are using self-assertion to the right degree.

Going inside the lopsided leader

A focus on lopsidedness opens a pathway to change that action-oriented managers might otherwise overlook—change from the inside out. Finding a manager's behavior to be off, too

much of one thing and too little of the opposite thing, we naturally wonder: What throws the behavior off? Why does a particular general manager go overboard on operational detail and at the same time give short shrift to strategy? What do we find when we draw back from his lopsided behavior? In this general manager's case, he wrongly believed that if he didn't "know everything" about the business, people would think the less of him; and, truth be known, he skimmed on strategic work not just because of the sucking action of his excessive orientation to detail but also because he harbored a fear of not being smart enough. This is where using not just a two-sided leadership model but also a yardstick with too much and too little on it proves to be useful: it captures lopsidedness and that in turn raises a practical question: What are the drivers?

In the face of a pair of leadership virtues, people tend to choose one over the other, and may not realize they are making a choice. They adopt a principle, a truth about leadership. For whatever personal, biographical, or organizational reason, they pluck it from the great universe of truths and lead or live by it. As they latch onto one, they don't recognize the companion truth that they are forsaking.


Let's take the case of an executive, a composite of men and women we've consulted to, who excels at treating people well. Lydia Milde listens well and creates an atmosphere where people feel comfortable speaking up in meetings. She empowers her staff and supports them when they need help. She is soft-spoken and non-threatening. And she believes strongly in this way of leading. She identifies with it powerfully. If one wall in her conference room represents this respectful, supportive approach, then she in effect faces that wall and embraces what it represents.

The hitch is that she has turned her back on the wall behind her. That wall represents power and self-assertion. It represents telling people what they may not want to hear—telling them, for example, that she is not satisfied with a piece of work or that she is unhappy that they missed a deadline. In fact, it is no accident that this executive has turned her back on that wall. She has an aversion to what it stands for. The side managers avert their eyes from becomes their blind side.

This is a nearly pure case of polarizing. The individual has formed a blind attachment to the supportive, enabling side of leadership, has married herself to it, and has divorced herself from the assertive, enforcing side. She has polarized because she can find practically no fault with the one side and mainly has misgivings about the other side. It is easy to understand why she feels that way about the type of leadership she disclaims: she keys on its excesses—like throwing one's weight around—and overlooks its virtues.

Just as this executive's leadership is rooted in her beliefs and feelings, so in general an individual's outward leadership is based on his or her character or personal make-up. That is why we put character at the base of our model of leadership. The table's surface represents leadership behavior, defined in terms of two basic pairs of opposites. And behavior rests, firmly or not so firmly, on the base of character, which consists of the individual's attitudes and beliefs, drives and fears, and modes of coping.

A two-sided model of leadership that can tilt to one side or the other points nicely to the inner leanings that account for the outward ones.



Motorola has adopted a model quite like this, consisting of just five leadership standards. The first four—envision and execute, edge and energize—run quite parallel to our two pairs. The fifth, ethics and character, coincides with what we have at the base. Although our firm helped to develop the model we had no hand in choosing these five standards. With our help Motorola also developed an assessment tool that, among other things, uses a do-more/do-less scale like ours.

Correcting lopsidedness

When a leader's behavior is off, we find that often what throws it off are distorted beliefs or sensitivities or both. This is not always true: sometimes the culprit is something as simple as a skill deficiency or lack of knowledge. Even then, however, a belief or feeling may have steered the manager away from picking up the knowledge or skill.

In the case of distorted beliefs, even generally clear-thinking, objective, rational managers can have screwy ideas about certain parts of the managerial job. They often have an unrealistic sense of what is expected of them, wildly overblown ideas about their capability or painfully self-diminishing estimates of their skill in one or another area. They also have exaggerated expectations about the consequences of not being so intense or they have twisted beliefs about the horrible things that might happen if they engage in what for them is taboo behavior. Sustaining these beliefs further, they are quite capable of rationalizing the counterproductive extremes to which they go as well as their persistent tendencies to neglect certain parts of their job. The fix is to straighten out the warped portions of their mental maps.

In addition to distorted beliefs, a substratum of sensitivities lies beneath off-kilter leadership.¹⁵ Managers worry needlessly, and the solution is if not to overcome the fear to at least recognize it and contain it. Much of it is fear of being inadequate, in a task sense or in a relationship sense. No one likes to be incompetent and humans of all ages and all walks of life are famous for avoiding activities we think we're not good at; in effect, underdoing it, which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Humans are equally capable, when threatened with the prospect of not doing something well, of doubling their efforts and thereby overdoing it.

The first step in correcting our own lopsidedness is to see it in ourselves. For it is the nature of lopsidedness that we may see the posture we take as right when it's wrong. Because all of this seems so self-evident in our head, we rarely put it to a reality test. As a result, many a manager doesn't recognize the biases that distort how he or she thinks about leadership and how he or she leads. We found this in our data: the executives' own reading of their versatility or lack thereof was inaccurate. Accordingly, self-ratings of versatility bore no relationship to self-ratings of overall effectiveness.¹⁶ Most of these managers seemed to have the idea that their preferred style is what works best

Rather than tend to regard their behavior as off-target, many managers tend to look upon it as the right and proper response to the task at hand. Because they place a high value on those things they overdo, they have a difficult time seeing how they could do too much of that thing. Because they place a low value on the things they underdo, they have trouble seeing how they could be neglecting that thing. It is no wonder that performance problems don't get corrected easily.

Even more striking in our research was the finding that self-ratings were barely related to coworker ratings—on versatility, effectiveness, or on the link between the two. Yet superior, peer, and subordinate ratings showed substantial convergence with each other. It seems that everyone sees lopsidedness and its link to ineffectiveness except for the person in question. It could be that being married to one side, along with writing off the other, leads managers to perceive their one-sided behavior as correct. This amounts to a failure to recognize two-sidedness.

Versatility is capacity to move freely and what stands in the way of increasing our versatility is the same thing that restricts our range in the first place, the inner aspect.

Bringing up the weak side. If we're not careful, we can imagine that making up a deficit is merely a matter of acquiring a skill. But the work of development takes place at least as much inside our heads as it resides in learning new behaviors or in fine-tuning a behavior already in our repertoire. Managers are poor prospects to learn a new skill that they do not see the value of or to work on a behavior that they abhor. To reverse an instance of underdoing often means contending with a misconception, a bias, a prejudicial attitude, or inhibition.

The easiest internal change to make is to simply recognize what the job requires. Upon moving up to an executive job, a manager we worked with said: "Oh, I didn't realize that at this level my job is not so much to make decisions as to manage the process by which decisions get made." It took work to make the adjustment in his or her behavior but at the idea level it was no trouble at all to correct this misconception of what his new job entailed.¹⁷

Often, however, the mental adjustment is not nearly as straightforward. Beyond not knowing, biases enter in. As we saw in the opening case, some executives neglect the operational part of the job because, in effect, they see it as beneath them. They think of it as being consumed with "details" and as taking them away from a higher calling. They will never do justice to this part of their job unless they overcome their bias.

It can be equally challenging to put a highly personal modus operandi into perspective. Take those individuals who, because of whatever childhood circumstances, learned to fend for themselves and who, without thinking, assume that the people working for them share their need for autonomy and self-sufficiency. If these managers are to provide the technical assistance and emotional support needed by their staff, they have to wake up to the distinction between their needs and their staff's needs.

Harder still is overcoming an inhibition or fear. We have seen executives avoid technical functions like IT or R&D out of, it emerged, a fear of inadequacy. To do justice to this responsibility, they must loosen the grip of this fear. Also, we have seen staff executives, saddled by their growing-up families with compunctions about self-promotion or egotism, have the hardest time asserting themselves or otherwise putting themselves forward. Said one staff executive, "I grew up in a family with a strong ethic against boastfulness, and I find it distasteful when people put themselves forward." Therefore to fill the role, staff executives like this one must not only work at modifying their behavior but must also keep these childhood commandments in check.

In order to grow, lopsided managers must contend with the fear, core to their identity, of what they would become if they move toward the neglected side. What do overly forceful managers worry about? That they will become weak, and they look down on weak people, wimps, in their eyes. Likewise, overly enabling managers worry they will become mean, abrasive, or power-mongering. Looking across the dividing line, they see not the virtues of the other side but the worst excesses, and they recoil. All this goes on unbeknownst to them, and for the weak side to get stronger this primitive fear must be raised to awareness and worked through. The more lopsided the manager, the more polarized the mind-set and the stiffer the emotional challenge.

What complicates the task of bringing up the neglected side is that otherwise objective managers have difficulty gauging how much of the behavior they are exhibiting and, afraid of exhibiting too much, they regularly overestimate. As one shrewd fellow said, "I'm learning that when I think I'm coming on like a ton of bricks not to worry about that because my sensors are bad and so my data is unreliable." Knowing this, he has taken to asking others for their reading.

In correcting lopsidedness it is not enough to bring up the weak side; we must also tamp down the excessively strong side.

Moderating the overused side. To stop overdoing it, we also come in for internal work, although of a somewhat different character. And rather than strengthening muscles that we have allowed to atrophy, we have the problem of managerial muscles developed to the point of hypertrophy. We somehow got into an upper-body mind-set and developed our arms and chest to a fare-the-well, without really noticing we neglected our legs.

A fair portion of overdoing springs from out-of-this-world expectations about what it means to work hard or to do well. Driven people lack objectivity about what is reasonable to expect of themselves, and others. The remedy is obvious, but learning that good enough is generally good enough is not like picking up facts in a textbook. And perfectionism can prove resistant to change.

The mental work on the overdone side often consists of learning to place not so high a value on a particular skill or personal quality. Frank Farr, the executive in the opening case, for example, would need to depart from his view that the true work of senior leadership was positioning the business for the future. Similarly, Lydia Milde, the executive who placed supreme value on being good to people would have to modify that view to make room for greater tough-mindedness.

Underneath distorted beliefs or exaggerated values often lies unacknowledged needs or fears. We have encountered senior managers with a towering sense of responsibility, to the extent that it deprived the senior people on their team of the full opportunity to do their jobs. Because of their personal history they are responding to a fear of not being responsible enough. Similarly, highly regarded managers who are afraid they do not add enough value tend to strain to prove themselves at every opportunity. One way to allay anxiety about not being good enough is to provide managers with enough positive feedback to begin to convince them of how competent they are, in general or in the particular respect they fret about.¹⁸

The key to moderating strengths taken to an extreme is to help managers learn to be more selective. In contemplating about easing up, managers tend to worry that they lose all of the capability they so heavily rely on. Unconsciously, they treat any modulation as binary. Rather than an on-off switch, they need to see the control mechanism as a dial, one that they simply can turn down a notch or two. They don't have to give up their gift; they can instead make more discriminating, and therefore more effective, use of it.

Conclusion

Whether our concern is with our own development or the development of others, it is helpful to recognize that leadership is two-sided and consider the basic balances to be struck. Further, we do well to be on the alert for tilting to one side or the other. Everpresent is the regrettable human tendency to polarize when confronted with oppositions. With that, we might profitably look to the prejudicial notions, the distorted thinking, and needless fears that underlie a leader's leanings and that also offer leverage for achieving better balance. For to grow as leaders, we must also grow as human beings.

Endnotes

1. All examples in this paper are based on one or more of our executive clients. Names and certain facts of circumstance have been changed for obvious reasons.
2. Pythagoras, "The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library," translated by K.S. Guthrie, ed. David Fideler (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1987).
3. R.R. Blake and J.S. Mouton, "The Managerial Grid" (San Francisco: Gulf, 1964), D. McGregor, "The Human Side of Enterprise" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), and R.E. Quinn, "Beyond Rational Management" (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988).
4. For a comprehensive review of the many variations on this theme, see B.M. Bass, "Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications," 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1990), 415–543.
5. W.M. McCall and M.M. Lombardo, "Off the Track: Why and How Successful Executives Get Derailed," (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1983), and M.M. Lombardo and C. McCauley, "The Dynamics of Management Derailment" (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1988).
6. The idea that overused strengths can become weaknesses is not entirely absent from the field of leadership assessment. It is, however, rarely reflected in the design of standard tools. When the idea is taken into account, it tends to be treated as an afterthought rather than integral to the design of the measure. For instance, there are instruments that render prescriptions for development by comparing ratings of "how often" the manager in question does a particular thing to an "ideal amount" that is estimated from a statistical formula. And there are a few instruments that have respondents rate how often the manager does a number of specific behaviors. Then at the end, they ask for global prescriptions on the handful of dimensions those behaviors comprise: do more, less, or the same. See examples in J.B. Leslie and J.W. Fleenor, "Feedback to Managers: A Review and Comparison of Multi-rater Instruments for Management Development" (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1998).
7. Aristotle, "The Nicomachean Ethics," translated by H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
8. The original research data reported here can be found in R.E. Kaplan and R.B. Kaiser, "Rethinking a Classic Distinction in Leadership: Implications for the Assessment and Development of Executives," *Consulting Psychology Journal: Research and Practice* 55, no. 1 (2003), 15-26, and R.B. Kaiser and R.E. Kaplan, "Leadership Versatility Index: User's Guide" (Greensboro, NC: Kaplan DeVries Inc., 2002).
9. Another advantage of the type of scale we have designed is that it allows for the fact that what is too much of something like taking charge in one organization or in a particular job is likely different from what is too much in another organization or job. We let the rater decide how much is too much or too little. Despite this "eye-of-the-beholder" subjectivity, we have found a great

deal of agreement between raters within the same source as well as across superior, peer, and subordinate sources. See Kaplan and Kaiser, "Rethinking."

10. In Kaplan and Kaiser, "Rethinking," and Kaiser and Kaplan, "User's Guide," respectively.

11. Bass, "Handbook," summed up the results from several reviews that examined the correlation between these two sides of leadership across hundreds of primary studies and noted that it is troubling that they are so often positively related and rather strongly so (Ch. 24).

12. "Contingency theory" was a popular movement in the study of leadership that began in the 1960s. These theories argued that what was the most effective leader behavior depended on circumstantial factors. See P. Hersey and K. H. Blanchard, "Management of Organizational Behavior" (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), and V.H. Vroom and P.W. Yetton, "Leadership and Decision-making" (New York: Wiley, 1973).

13. We use a statistical formula derived from Pythagorean geometry to create a versatility index, a percentage that represents how close an individual's ratings are to "the right amount" on both sides of a duality. See Kaplan and Kaiser, "Rethinking."

14. The correlation between effectiveness and versatility on the forceful-enabling duality was +.53 in Kaplan and Kaiser, "Rethinking," and +.81 in Kaiser and Kaplan, "User's Guide." In an unpublished study of ratings from 265 coworkers, the correlations with effectiveness were +.59 for forceful-enabling versatility and +.61 for strategic-operational versatility.

15. R.E. Kaplan and R.B. Kaiser, "The Turbulence Within: How Sensitivities Throw Off Performance in Executives," in "Leading in Turbulent Times," eds. R.J. Burke and C.L. Cooper (Oxford: Blackwell, in press).

16. Kaplan and Kaiser, "Rethinking."

17. The changes in perspective and values that are required in making upward transitions have been described most recently by R. Charan, S. Drotter, and J. Noel, "The Leadership Pipeline" (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001).

18. R.E. Kaplan, "Know Your Strengths," Harvard Business Review 80 (March 2002): 20-21.